Die Verländerung der UN-Mission steht in Kürze zur Abstimmung im Sicherheitsrat. Im Vordergrund der Mission steht die Kooperation mit der Operation Berkhane und mit den G5 Joint Forces, die im Februar 2018 in einem Technical Arrangement zwischen der EU, G5 Sahel und der UN geschlossen wurde. Der UN Generalsekretär berichtet alle drei Monate über die Entwicklung der Mission in Mali. Im jüngsten Bericht zu MINUSMA vom 02.06. 20 bemängelt der Generalsekretär die fehlende Nachhaltigkeit der Unterstützung für die G5 JF, deren Einsätze in den Grenzgebieten zwischen den G5 Staaten gleichermaßen dem „Counter-Terrorism“ wie der Migrationsabwehr dienen. Vor der Verlängerung des Mandats diskutiert er verschiedene Möglichkeiten der Stablisierung einer Komplementarität von MINUSMA und G5 Sahel JF. In diesem Zusammenhang steht auch der Beschluss des deutschen Bundestags, weiterhin Soldaten nach Mali zu entsenden. Zudem wird ein gemeinsames Kommandosysten von Berkhane, G5 JF und MINUSMA geschaffen.

A.Options for enhanced international support to the Joint Force ofthe Group of Five for the Sahel

62.Most partners were of the view that the current approach is not sustainable in the long term, especially with a likely increase in operations in the Sahel following the establishment of the Coalition for the Sahel. The current support mechanism depends entirely on the availability of donor funding and does not allow for long-term planning. Its current mandate and the subsequent arrangements and procedures enshrined in the technical arrangement, signed on 23 February 2018 between the European Union, the G5 Sahel and the United Nations, are not commensurate with the needs of a counter-terrorism operation, which requires maximum flexibility.

Option 1: establishment of a dedicated, separate United Nations support office providing full logistical and operational support, including transport, as well as tactical and strategic support to the Joint Force

63.I have repeatedly advocated for the Security Council to authorize a logistical support package for the Joint Force,similar to the one for the African Union Mission in Somalia, delivered by the United Nations to non-United Nations missions through assessed contributions. I propose this as an interim measure until the G5 Sahel develops and strengthens its own capacity to support its own force.

64.A dedicated United Nations support office for the G5 Sahel could provide such a package in the Joint Force’s areas of operations that would include the following: aeromedical evacuation capacity and related medical support; life support services, including rations, fuel and water, adapted to the requirements of the Joint Force; consumables, including field defence stores, first aid kits, tactical tentage, accommodation materiel and medical supplies; technical support to apply and implement the human rights due diligence policy; capacity for managing its environmental footprint; maintenance contracts, geospatial, telecommunications and information technology and infrastructure support; and transport and other types of support provided to the Joint Force and its troops.

65.This option would have several advantages. It would provide for sustainable and predictable funding and allow for more long-term planning. It would also enable the Security Council to have the best oversight of the support provided to the Joint Force and ensure that the support is provided in accordance with appropriate standards and accountability, while promoting the multilateral approach in a fluid regional context. Establishing such a United Nations entity dedicated entirely to supporting the Joint Force and/or the Coalition for the Sahel would allow for a clear distinction between MINUSMA and a logistics operation intended to support regional counter-terrorism operations.

Option 2: establishment of a dedicated, separate United Nations support office providing support to the Joint Force to be funded by a dedicated trust fund

66.Alternatively, should the United Nations be authorized to provide support to the Joint Force outside Mali, it could establish a logistical support package for the Joint Force through a dedicated trust fund as an interim measure to provide some of the services described above. The capacity to manage and oversee the delivery of support would also need to be drawn from the voluntary trust fund. The level of support to be provided and its efficacy would depend on the level of sustained funding by donors, which would have an impact on the timeliness of the planning and delivery of supplies and services. Under this option, the Secretariat would seek to leverage its broad expertise in providing support to field entities in finding practical solutions to some of these challenges. Option 3

67.In the absence of a more comprehensive solution, the following alternatives could be pursued to address immediate challenges in the short term. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive and could be considered either alone or in combination.

(a)Strengthening of the capacity of the Joint Force to procure and provide life support68.Strengthening the Joint Force’s own capacity to procure and provide life support for its contingents would be the most sustainable alternative. Donors who already extensively support the G5 Sahel could provide stipends to the contingents to procure their own locally sourced life support consumables. This option could be explored in particular with regard to food rations and fuel.

69.A parallel long-term and holistic approach could be pursued to build the capacity of the Joint Force or the executive secretariat of theG5 Sahel to set up its own procurement system. This would require bestowing the Joint Force or the executive secretariat with their own legal capacity to enter into commercial agreements with vendors and receive payments from and issue payments to third parties.

(b)United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali continues to provide ration packs and fuel but other partners deliver or contract freight forwarding companies directly for delivery

70.To address the Joint Force’s persistent transport and storage capability shortfalls, a donor could contract its own freight forwarding companies for the delivery of life support consumables procured by MINUSMA to the Joint Force’s areas of operations. This approach would not require any adjustments to the Mission’s mandate.

(c)United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali is authorized by the Security Council to undertake the delivery of life support supplies beyond its area of operations

71.Alternatively, the Security Council could extend the mandate of MINUSMA and authorize the Mission to undertake the delivery of life support supplies beyond the current collection points in Mali to areas closer to the Joint Force’s areas of operations in Mali, BurkinaFaso, the Niger, Mauritania and Chad. The success of this support arrangement would depend on the availability of commercial contractors and voluntary contributions by donors. Under no circumstances does the United Nations
deliver life support supplies tocombat areas. Water, rations and fuel for its own contingents are delivered to collection points through a turnkey contractor.

72.Outside of Mali, the Joint Force indicated a preference to receive life support supplies in the capitals of the other four member States of the G5 Sahel if delivery to its areas of operations was not feasible. Under this option, the respective countries could decide on the type of food supply, whether ration packs or fresh rations, some of which may be sourced from the local markets and which would be procured and delivered by a contractor engaged by MINUSMA. This approach would require the recruitment of dedicated staff to undertake a procurement process, contract administration and operations, since the resources currently available in MINUSMA to provide such support are not sufficient. The United Nations would also need to establish a legal framework and secure exemption from tax and other duties, as well as privileges and immunities, for its contractors in each member State of the G5 Sahel where support would be delivered.

73.Such a model would require security arrangements and the availability of commercial contractors operating in these areas. MINUSMA does not have the mandate or resources to provide security for third parties beyond Malian territory and authorized drop-off locations. The model would also present a significant challenge with regard to liabilities, given that freight forwarding companies have filed significant claims against MINUSMA for damaged or destroyedequipment in the past as a result of hostile actions. Any such arrangement would require donors to make the necessary financial provision for these potential liabilities.


Noch einmal: MINUSMA