

MIXED MIGRATION ROUTES AND DYNAMICS IN LIBYA, MAY - DECEMBER 2018

JANUARY 2019

In 2018 refugee and migrant sea arrivals from Libya to Europe have been at an unprecedented low since the onset of refugee and migrant sea arrivals from 2011 onwards: only 15,342 refugees and migrants arrived from Libya in 2018, a seven-fold decrease compared to the previous year.¹ Interceptions and returns to Libya, operated by the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG), increased drastically, with 47 per cent of all individuals who left Libya by boat being returned to the country, 15,235 individuals.² At the same time, the risk of death at sea doubled from two per cent in 2017 to four per cent in 2018.³ Three thousand three hundred and eleven individuals were reported dead or missing in the Mediterranean sea off the Libyan coast in 2018.⁴

The decline in arrivals at Italian shores, and rise in deaths at sea, has coincided with three major trends in the Mediterranean region: first, since early 2017, a number of migration measures have been implemented in Libya and the Sahel region in cooperation with the European Union (EU) to stem the flow of arrivals to Italy, one of which included increased EU support for the LCG along the western coast of the country.⁵ Second, in mid-2018, Libyan authorities declared a Libyan Search And Rescue (SAR) zone off Libya's western coast, in a maritime area previously mostly coordinated by the Italian coast guard, enabling Libyan authorities to return shipwrecked individuals to Libya, rather than carrying rescued individuals to European shores.^{6,7} Third, since mid-2017 increased legal and political attacks on charity and privately-run rescue ships have led to an almost complete seizure of all rescue at sea activities by charity or privately-run rescue boats.⁸ As of January 2019, only one privately-run SAR boat was operating between Libya and Italy.⁹

At the same time, the situation for the 670,000 refugees and migrants estimated to be in Libya in 2018¹⁰ remains severe, as documented by a variety of UN and other international actors. Human rights violations and abuses against refugees and migrants are reportedly perpetrated by 'a range of State officials, armed groups, smugglers and traffickers', both inside and outside official detention centres.^{11,12,13} In August 2018, armed clashes reemerged in western Tripoli, displacing an estimated 3,845 households and illustrating the still highly volatile security situation in Libya.¹⁴


As the severe protection risks for refugees and migrants in Libya are well documented, and the possibility to leave the country via sea is increasingly shrinking, the question arises as to what the impact of these developments is on mixed migration routes to and within Libya, and the extent to which developments along the coast and in the country impact flows to Libya and from Libya to neighbouring

countries. In a study conducted in April 2018, IMPACT's initiative REACH had found that migration routes to and within Libya had diversified as a result of migration measures implemented, with an increase in smuggling hubs in the east of the country.¹⁵ The study also found that refugees and migrants remained increasingly hidden, moving as little as possible, to cope with the severe protection risks faced. At the same time, knowledge about the security situation in Libya and migration measures implemented had reportedly not impacted refugees' and migrants' decision to go or stay in Libya.

The present assessment, conducted in partnership with UNHCR, builds on the findings identified during the first study, with the aim to identify changes in mixed migration dynamics in Libya in December 2018, eight months after REACH's previous study on mixed migration dynamics, in April 2018. It explores in greater depth: (1) changes in migration routes to Libya since April 2018; (2) changes in refugee and migrant mobility within Libya, with a particular focus on the East and the impact of increased violent clashes in parts of Libya on mobility within the country and (3) the extent to which migration of refugees and migrants from Libya to neighbouring countries has been changing, as a result of developments along Libya's coast and continued protection risks for refugees and migrants inside Libya.

The assessment finds that mixed migration routes to and within Libya have not changed since April 2018. While a decrease in arrivals from Niger was recorded, there seems to be an increase in refugees and migrants entering Libya via Chad. At the same time, albeit the severe protection risks and increasingly more limited economic opportunities refugees and migrants face in

Map 1: Data collection sites in Libya




Libya, reasons for migration to Libya of newly arrived individuals had not changed, as the situation in countries of origin reportedly had not improved. Emigration to Libya's neighbouring countries was reportedly low, as respondents still felt that Libya remained the most attractive destination for refugees and migrants in the region, both to work and to transit to Italy. Considering alternative future destinations in the region, the most reported potential future destination for refugees and migrants in the region was Tunisia.

Routes to Libya

Key informants reported no major changes in the main entry points to Libya since April 2018. Most refugees and migrants were reportedly entering Libya (1) via Niger or Chad along Libya's southern borders; (2) via Algeria on the north-western or south-western border with Libya and (3) via the eastern route with refugees and migrants reaching the south-eastern region of Alkufra transiting through both Chad and Sudan. The route from Egypt to Libya was reportedly used by fewer refugees and migrants than the previous year and mostly by Egyptian nationals engaged in circular migration.

The majority of key informants reported an overall slight decrease in arrival numbers, mostly along Libya's border with Niger, reportedly a result of migration measures implemented in Niger from 2015 onwards.¹⁶ Refugees and migrants interviewed who had entered the country recently along Libya's southern border confirmed that crossing through Niger had become more difficult. This is corroborated by other reports on recent migration to Libya from neighbouring countries,¹⁷ as well as by the decreased number of refugees and migrants recorded by the International Organization for Migration (IOM)'s flow monitoring tool, the displacement tracking matrix (DTM), passing through Northern Niger over the course of 2018.¹⁸

Map 2: migration routes to and within Libya



Along Libya's border with Chad, the majority of key informants and refugees and migrants interviewed reported an increase in arrivals. This was already found by REACH in April 2018 and is corroborated by other secondary sources.¹⁹ Among non-Chadian nationals who entered Libya via Chad, respondents reported that refugees and migrants had either entered Chad from Niger or from Sudan. Both routes were reportedly likely increasingly used due to the rising crackdown on migration in both Niger and Sudan. Possible re-routing from both Niger and Sudan through Chad to Libya was also found in a recent study on the impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes in September 2018.²⁰ That study also found that migrants from countries such as Senegal, Mali, Liberia, Somalia and Eritrea, who were rarely seen in Chad in the past, were increasingly crossing Chad towards Libya.²¹ The extent to which the increase in arrivals from Chad is largely to be attributed to a re-routing from Niger or from Sudan could not be ascertained in the present assessment. Along Libya's border with Algeria, the majority of key informants reported a decrease in refugee and migrant arrivals, attributed to the increased crackdown on migration in the country in 2018. Refugees and migrants reported that the border with Algeria was highly militarized and difficult to cross. This is corroborated by other secondary sources and presents a change from April 2018, when respondents had identified an increase in arrivals to Libya from Algeria.²²

The majority of refugees and migrants and key informants interviewed also reported that the profiles of recently arrived refugees and migrants and their reasons for coming to Libya had not changed compared to the past. This is confirmed by IOM DTM findings from April to November 2018, during which timeframe most reported refugee and migrant nationalities in Libya remained constant. Drivers for migration to Libya had reportedly remained unchanged, with the majority of respondents reporting that individuals left their countries of origin and came to Libya due

to violence, fear of individual persecution, as well as poor economic opportunities. Respondents stressed that it was the situation back home which urged many people to leave, rather than the attractiveness of Libya as a destination (further discussed below).

Routes and smuggling within Libya

Overall, the majority of key informants and refugees and migrants interviewed reported little change in routes and smuggling dynamics within Libya since April 2018. While key informants reported that minor punctual changes in routes continuously occurred, in response to changes or an increase in security forces in certain areas, respondents held that smuggling networks overall were well established with little need to change drastically since April 2018.

“All the women I know here came escaping from poverty, hunger, ethnic conflict in their countries ... escaping with their children from death. I do not think these conditions have changed in their countries of origin, so migrants’ reasons for coming here will not change as well.”

Nigerian woman, Azzawya

Smuggling hubs in the east and west of Libya

While traditionally the main smuggling hubs and vast majority of refugee and migrant boat departures occurred along the western coast of Libya, in April 2018 REACH had found an increase in smuggling hubs along the eastern coast, mirroring the increase in anti-smuggling operations in the west. Eight months on, the majority of key informants held that these secondary routes and smuggling hubs in the east were still functioning.

With regards to boat departures from the eastern coast, responses were mixed. While the majority of key informants and refugees and migrants interviewed held that the vast majority of boat departures still occurred from the western coast, there has been an increase in reported deaths of refugees and migrants closer to Libya’s eastern coast, notably in Sirte.²³ As such, while the majority of boat departures seem to still occur from the western coast, it may also be that departures from the east remain underreported.

When refugees and migrants were asked why most attempted to cross from the western coast, most reported responses were, first, that the western coast was closer to Italy, hence the journey shorter and, second, that there was less security in the west and that, as a result, many more smugglers were operating along the western coast. Five individuals reported that crossing from the west was cheaper than the east and hence the usually preferred option. Four individuals reported that since many refugees and migrants entered the country through the south-west or west, the western coast was also closer to reach. Considering the reportedly high level of control and security in eastern Libya, these findings indicate that the western coast remains the main departure area for boats to Italy and may remain so in the near future, unless there are major changes in the security situation in the east of the country.

The impact of armed clashes in Tripoli on migration routes within Libya

When asked about respondents’ security situation and everyday lives in Libya, the vast majority of refugees and migrants reported that it had either remained unchanged or further deteriorated since April 2018. The factors that reportedly contributed to refugees and

The story of an Eritrean man, interviewed in Azzawya

“I left Eritrea through Ethiopia and then Sudan, and then I arrived in Libya. I remained for a year and seven months as a prisoner in a detention centre in Alkufra, there was no way out. [...] There are many detention centers in the west and south, where migrants are sent to the coast after being sold from one smuggler to another. Security has become worse: smugglers are not able to send their boats to Europe, and there are less boats than before, so they discipline the migrants, sell us and rape the women and sell them.

I don’t know anything about the recent clashes in Tripoli, but yes, many migrants do not want to stay in Libya because of just how horrible it is.

I will never tell my brother to come to Libya, he may be kidnapped by the smugglers, punished or killed and I will regret having asked him to come. Still, the security situation in Libya is better than the situation in my country. I am not thinking of returning home. I just can’t.”

migrants’ difficult situation in the country, protection risks ranging from arbitrary detention to systemic exploitation, as well as the loss of value of the Libyan Dinar, which has been ongoing since 2016, had remained unchanged.²⁴

Notably, the vast majority of key informants reported that the violent clashes in Tripoli between August and September 2018 had had no particular impact on migration routes within Libya. This was reportedly because the clashes were concentrated in certain parts of the city, not affecting smuggling in the area. This was also confirmed by the majority of refugees and migrants interviewed, of whom more than two thirds reported that the clashes had had no impact on their migration plans in Libya. Refugees and migrants interviewed reported that they were used to sudden localized eruptions of violence in the country and that already their situation in the country was very difficult. As a result, respondents reported only waiting for the clashes to calm down to then carry on with their everyday lives.

“Some of the people I know in Tripoli when they faced the conflict left, but most did not, because it happens only in specific locations and specific times, so they just waited for it to be over. As for me, I’ll stay and work in Libya whether it’s a good situation or not because I have no future if I went back to Niger.”

Nigerien man, Garaboli

Routes to leave Libya

The majority of refugees and migrants interviewed reported that, albeit the challenges they faced in Libya, they intended to remain in the country for the foreseeable future. Yet, one third of respondents reported that there was an overall increase among refugees and migrants they knew who intended to leave Libya. As crossing via boat in 2018 had increasingly become difficult, illustrated by the significant decrease in arrivals from Libya in Italy, refugees and migrants were asked to discuss the extent to which individuals they knew were crossing into neighbouring countries, and their role as potential future destinations from Libya, both for refugees and migrants looking for work in the region, as well as new transit destinations for individuals intending to reach Europe.

Present movement to neighbouring countries

As of December 2018, the majority of key informants reported little movement of refugees and migrants from Libya to neighbouring countries, mostly due to high levels of security along neighbouring borders. The Libyan borders with Egypt, Algeria and Sudan were reportedly highly militarized and difficult to cross into.²⁵ The border between Libya and Tunisia was reportedly also well controlled, especially in view of people smuggling towards Tunisia (goods smuggling was reportedly more common). Libya's southern borders with Niger and Chad were reportedly more porous and, due to the long history of circular migration in the region, key informants reported it more likely that there was regular out-movement from Libya towards the south, which they were, however, unable to quantify.

Map 3: Cross-border movement between Libya and its neighbouring countries, December 2018



Refugees and migrants interviewed largely confirmed these observations. The majority of respondents knew of family or friends who had recently exited Libya via the south of the country, however, most said these were circular migration patterns, whereby individuals were expected to return to Libya after some time in their country of origin. Only few respondents had friends who had recently left for Algeria, Sudan, and Egypt for non-Egyptian nationals, as they reported these borders very difficult to cross and overall not destination for refugees and migrants in Libya. With regards to Tunisia, one in four respondents reported having a friend or family member who had recently left Libya to Tunisia. Cross-border movement from Libya to Tunisia was also found in another REACH study on sub-Saharan migration patterns to Tunisia.²⁶ The extent to which this may become an increasing trend is to be monitored.

Destination Libya

The vast majority of refugees and migrants interviewed reported that Libya was still an attractive destination for refugees and migrants in the region. This was reportedly despite the severe protection risks respondents faced, the crackdown on boat departures along Libya's western coast and the fall of the Libyan Dinar, which heavily impacted refugees and migrants' lives who were in the country to work. When asked why, the majority held that, despite the challenges faced, they could still find work in the country and earn more than in any other country in the region. At the same time, while there was general agreement that transiting to Italy had become increasingly difficult, respondents held that Libya was still the easiest transit country for them to Europe, due to an overall lack of rule of law and well established smuggling networks. As such, refugees and migrants reported that the same reasons which made their stay in Libya dangerous and difficult, namely a lack of rule of law and limited law enforcement, also made it an attractive destination for some refugees and migrants. This was because limited rule of law meant that it was reportedly relatively easy to find work, albeit mostly in extremely exploitative conditions, as well as to transit to Italy.

"Libya is better in terms of job opportunities [compared to neighbouring countries]. There is also less control of migrants, which is good. [...] I wouldn't advice my sister to come here. I do not want her to suffer like us."

Nigerien man, Sebha

Still, when respondents, who were predominantly young males, were asked whether they would recommend their sister or a female friend to join them in Libya, the vast majority reported that they would not recommend her to come. This was reportedly in acknowledgement of the extremely tough situation respondents faced in Libya, which they felt they could endure, but they would not recommend to other individuals who they deemed less capable to deal with adversity than them.

Outlook: Networks, level of information and perceived attractiveness

To discern the extent to which neighbouring countries may become destinations for refugees and migrants in Libya in the future, personal networks and level of information among refugees and migrants about the situation in neighbouring countries can serve as proxy indicators to determine the likelihood of future increased emigration. As such, refugees and migrants were asked about their personal connections, knowledge of the situation in neighbouring countries (in terms of economy, security and other factors they deemed important) and whether they thought these countries may be attractive destinations for refugees and migrants in Libya.

Two thirds of refugee and migrant respondents reported not having any information about the situation in neighbouring countries. Among those who reportedly had some information, most of what they knew was reportedly negative. When asked about people they knew in neighbouring countries, the majority of respondents knew someone in Libya's southern neighbours, Niger and Chad (mirroring the countries of origin and cultural ties of many respondents).

Re-routing to Spain from Libya via Morocco

While refugee and migrant arrivals at Italy's shores decreased drastically in 2018, arrivals to Spain from Morocco have seen a new increase, with 58,569 refugees and migrants arriving in Spain from Morocco in 2018, making Spain the first port of entry for refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean region that year.²⁸ As some of the countries of origin of arrivals from Morocco in Spain mirror arrivals in Italy, which had previously arrived from Libya,²⁹ the question has arisen as to which extent a re-routing is occurring of mixed migration flows from Libya to Morocco, and whether this re-routing occurs once in Libya or already further south in origin countries. Among refugees and migrants interviewed, only one respondent reportedly knew someone who had recently transited

from Libya to Morocco with the aim to reach Europe via Spain. In that case, the individual had exited from Libya's southern border with Niger, as the border crossing with Algeria was reportedly too difficult to cross from Libya. The low level of reporting of refugees and migrants re-routing from Libya towards Morocco may indicate that refugees and migrants decide to travel to Europe via Morocco earlier in their journey, as they have information about the difficulty to transit to Europe from Libya already before they reach Libya. The phenomenon may also be underreported in the present sample. In either case, re-routing from the central Mediterranean to the western Mediterranean route and the level of information about the situation in Libya which leads to re-routing requires further investigation.

One in four respondents had a friend or personal connection in Tunisia and one in six in Algeria. Almost all respondents who knew someone in Egypt were Egyptians, as was the case for Sudanese nationals.

When asked whether any neighbouring country may be an attractive destination for refugees and migrants in the region, three out of four respondents did not feel that any of Libya's neighbouring countries may be attractive destinations for refugees and migrants currently in Libya, while one in six held that they could be attractive. A minority of respondents held that neighbouring countries may be attractive destinations in the region, but less than Libya. Eleven individuals reported that neighbouring countries may be attractive to transit only, towards Europe.

When asked why the majority of respondents did not think that countries neighbouring Libya could be attractive destinations for refugees and migrants, respondents reported two main reasons: first, respondents held that in countries neighbouring Libya there would be less work for refugees and migrants, important as many were in Libya with the aim to work to support their family back home. Second, respondents reported that higher levels of security and need for legal documentation would make their stay in those countries more difficult, as most respondents deemed it unlikely that they would be able to stay in neighbouring countries with the necessary legal documentation.²⁷

"I do not think there are other attractive destinations for migrants here [other than Libya]. Because these countries fight immigration, arrest migrants and deport them to their countries. There is no chance for an immigrant who wants to work or migrate to Europe except Libya."

Guinean (equ.) man, Ghat

In terms of attractiveness of destinations, respondents distinguished between countries which may be attractive for work and those that may mainly be attractive for transiting to Europe. To work, Algeria was mostly ruled out, as was Egypt, due to high security measures implemented towards refugees and migrants in both countries. Tunisia was reportedly attractive in terms of potential transit to Europe, but less so for work, as respondents reported that there were less economic opportunities for refugees and migrants in the country, compared to Libya. Morocco was overall not reported as an attractive destination, both in terms of work, but also in view of migration to Europe.

Conclusion

The assessment finds that, albeit continued severe protection risks for refugees and migrants and increased anti-smuggling and coast guard operations along Libya's western coast, leading to a stark decrease in boat departures, mixed migration routes to and within Libya have not changed between April and December 2018. While a decrease in arrivals from Niger was recorded, respondents reported a potential increase in arrivals of refugees and migrants from Chad, already found in April 2018.

The profiles of newly arrived refugees and migrants, and their reasons for leaving their countries of origin and coming to Libya, had reportedly remained unchanged between April and December 2018. This suggests that the causes which make individuals leave their countries of origin and face the dangers in Libya have not improved. It also indicates that migration to Libya from the region may continue, despite increased anti-smuggling efforts in the country, as the conditions which make refugees and migrants leave home remain unaddressed.

According to most key informants, the clashes in the city of Tripoli between August and September 2018, had no major impact on smuggling networks in the country, with Tripoli remaining a major transit and destination hub for refugees and migrants in the country. This illustrates both the level to which refugees and migrants in Libya are used to severe security risks and their ability to deal with adversity, as well as the resilience of smuggling networks in the face of armed clashes. It also illustrates the degree of highly localized conflict in many parts of Libya.

Within the North African region, the majority of respondents reported that Libya remained the most attractive destination for refugees and migrants, as most other neighbouring countries had either more stringent immigration rules or held less economic opportunities for refugees and migrants. The country which was mentioned most as possible alternative destination, by one in four respondents, was Tunisia, which was considered attractive for refugees and migrants intending to transit to Europe, rather than for those aiming to work in the region.

While the majority of refugees and migrants interviewed reported that they wanted to remain in Libya for the near future, one third reported that there was an increase in refugees and migrants wanting to leave Libya, due to heightened protection risks and the deteriorating economic situation in the country. As these factors are


unlikely to improve substantially in the near future, and in light of the crackdown on irregular boat departures to Europe, the question arises as to where refugees and migrants can leave Libya to.

Methodology

This brief presents findings from an assessment on mixed migration routes and dynamics in Libya, conducted in nine locations across the country between 01 and 25 December 2018. It is based on 90 individual interviews administered with refugees and migrants and 27 key informant interviews. Locations assessed were selected on the basis of their hosting large refugee and migrant communities according to IOM DTM,³⁰ being located at the border with Libya's neighbouring countries, as well as representing main geographic regions in the country (east, west, south). The cities included were Tripoli, Zwara, Azzawya, Ghat, Wazen, Ras Jedir, Sebha, Kufra and Ejdabia.

In each location, 10 individual interviews with refugees and migrants were administered. Refugees and migrants were purposively sampled on the basis of their region of origin (Central and West Africa, Asia, Middle East and North Africa) and the length of time they had been in the country for (more than one year or less). In addition, in each location three in-depth semi-structured individual interviews with key informants were administered. Key informants were selected on the basis of their expertise on mixed migration routes and communities and included law enforcement officials, civil society representatives, human rights activists, smugglers and humanitarian aid workers.

Map 4: Regions of origin of refugees and migrants interviewed



Data collection was carried out by field teams; all received tailored training on qualitative data collection and interview skills, as well as on ethical considerations around data collection with vulnerable groups. All primary data was triangulated with existing secondary data. Raw data was analysed using qualitative data analysis software Atlas Ti.

As this assessment employed qualitative research methods, results are indicative only and cannot be generalized for the entire population of refugees and migrants in Libya. Only individuals outside detention centres were interviewed, hence no information on the situation in detention centres was collected.

About IMPACT

IMPACT Initiatives is a Geneva based think-and-do-tank, created in 2010. IMPACT is a member of the ACTED Group.

IMPACT's teams implement assessment, monitoring & evaluation and organisational capacity-building programmes in direct partnership with aid actors or through its inter-agency initiatives, REACH and Agora. Headquartered in Geneva, IMPACT has an established field presence in over 22 countries. IMPACT's team is composed of over 300 staff, including 150 full-time international experts, as well as a roster of consultants, who are currently implementing over 50 programmes across Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Central and South-East Asia, and Eastern Europe.

End notes

1. This data is based on a review of all data available on refugee and migrant departures from Libya, interceptions, death and missing figures conducted by Matteo Villa, migration researcher at the Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), based in Milan, Italy. Data sources include UNHCR, IOM; the Italian Ministry of Interior and relevant press sources. The dataset is available [here](#).
2. This compares to 11% of individuals among total departures in 2017 who were intercepted and returned to Libya. Figures obtained by calculating the number of individuals arrested at sea by the Libyan coast guard compared to the total number of individuals who attempted to cross the sea from Libya and either arrived to Italy or died at sea. The latter figures are available at [IOM Missing migrants project](#).
3. Calculation based on dataset consolidated on basis of different data sources, available at Villa, M., [Dataset](#), accessed 16 January 2019.
4. UNHCR, [Mediterranean Situation Dashboard](#), accessed 13 January 2019.
5. For more information, please consult REACH/UNHCR, [Mixed Migration Dynamics in Libya: the impact of EU migration measures on mixed migration in Libya](#), April 2018.
6. Euronews, [Prompted by EU, Libya quietly claims right to order rescuers to return fleeing migrants](#), 7 August 2018. Accessed 13 January 2019.
7. Reported impacts of Libyan coast guards coordination on rescuing lives at sea include ignored distress calls, dangerous interceptions and complicity of the Libyan coast guard in human smuggling and abuse. For further information please consult: Amnesty International, [Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea - Europe Fails Refugees and Migrants in the Central Mediterranean](#), August 2018; Amnesty International, [Libya's Dark Web of Collusion: Abuses Against Europe-Bound Refugees and Migrants](#), 11 December 2017; UN Security Council, Letter Dated 1 June 2017 from the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 1 June 2017, S/2017/466, para 105, available [here](#).
8. Deutsche Welle (DW), [Italy to block naval vessels carrying migrants from docking: Interior Minister Matteo Salvini](#), 9 July 2018. Accessed 13 January 2019; Cuttitta, P. (2018) Pushing Migrants Back to Libya, Persecuting Rescue NGOs: The End of the Humanitarian Turn (Part II). Available [here](#), accessed 13 January 2019.
9. On the discussion whether SAR boats in the Mediterranean in 2017/8 lead to an increase or decrease in deaths at sea, please consult: Matteo Villa, 11 September 2018, ["Outsourcing European Border Control: Recent Trends in Departures, Deaths, and Search and Rescue Activities in the Central Mediterranean"](#), accessed 16 January 2019.
10. IOM DTM, [Libya's Migrants Report, Round 22](#). October 2018.
11. OHCHR and UNSMIL, [Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya](#), 20 December 2018.
12. OHCHR and UNSMIL, [Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya](#), 20 December 2018.
13. OHCHR, [Oral update of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 34/38](#), 20 March 2018; MSF, [European governments are feeding the business of suffering](#), 7 September 2017; Amnesty International, [Libya's Dark Web of Collusion: Abuses Against Europe-bound Refugees and Migrants](#), 11 December 2017; Amnesty International, [Libya: desperate plight of detained migrants has 'deteriorated' - new briefing](#), 12 November 2018; Human Rights Watch, [No Escape from Hell](#), 21 January 2019.
14. REACH Initiative, [Tripoli: Joint Rapid Situation Overview Libya](#), 21 September 2018.
15. REACH/UNHCR, [Mixed Migration Dynamics in Libya: the impact of EU migration measures on mixed migration in Libya](#), April 2018
16. For more information, please consult: REACH/UNHCR, [Mixed Migration Dynamics in Libya: the impact of EU migration measures on mixed migration in Libya](#), April 2018; and Sudan Tribune, [Sudan, Libya, Chad and Niger sign border protection agreement](#), 02 June 2018, accessed 13 January 2019.
17. Tubiana, J., Warin, C. and Saeneen, G., [Multilaterale damage: the impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes](#), September 2018.
18. IOM DTM, [Population Flow Monitoring, Niger – Migration Trends](#), Dashboard 17, 1-30 November 2018.
19. Please consult: REACH/UNHCR, [Mixed Migration Dynamics in Libya: the impact of EU migration measures on mixed migration in Libya](#), April 2018, and Tubiana, J., Warin, C. and Saeneen, G., [Multilaterale damage: the impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes](#), September 2018.
20. Tubiana, J., Warin, C. and Saeneen, G., [Multilaterale damage: the impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes](#), September 2018.
21. Tubiana, J., Warin, C. and Saeneen, G., [Multilaterale damage: the impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes](#), September 2018.
22. Debora Del Pistoia, 10 July, 2018, ["Why Algeria is emptying itself of African migrant workers"](#), News Deeply, July, last accessed 16 January 2019 and Jennifer O'Mahony, 25 June 2018, ["Algeria dumps thousands of migrants in the Sahara amid EU-funded crackdown"](#), last accessed 16 January 2019.
23. In January 2019, 20 bodies were recovered off the shore in Sirte. In December 2018, 15 persons reportedly drowned off the eastern coast near the city of Misrata. Source: MSF-Sea, [Twitter feed 14 January 2019](#), accessed 16 January 2019.
24. REACH/UNHCR, [Access to cash and the impact of the liquidity crisis on refugees and migrants in Libya](#), June 2018.
25. On Sudan, please consult: Tubiana, J., Warin, C. and Saeneen, G., [Multilaterale damage: the impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes](#), September 2018. On Algeria, please see: Debora Del Pistoia, 10 July, 2018, ["Why Algeria is emptying itself of African migrant workers"](#), News Deeply, July, accessed 16 January 2019 and Jennifer O'Mahony, 25 June 2018, ["Algeria dumps thousands of migrants in the Sahara amid EU-funded crackdown"](#), accessed 16 January 2019.
26. REACH, [Tunisia, country of destination and transit for sub-Saharan African migrants](#), October 2018.
27. Please note that responses were based on refugees' and migrants' perceptions of the situation and the information they had access to. Responses may hence not necessarily reflect the actual situation in neighbouring countries.
28. UNHCR, [Mediterranean Situation Dashboard](#), accessed 13 January 2019.
29. Primary countries of origin of individuals who arrived primarily in Italy in 2017 and who, in 2018, predominantly arrived in Spain include, among others, Guinean, Ivorian and Malian nationals. For further information, please consult: UNHCR, [Mediterranean Situation Dashboard](#), accessed 13 January 2019; see also: Brenner, Y., Forin, R., Frouws, B., [The "Shift" to the Western Mediterranean Migration Route: Myth or Reality?](#), 22 August 2018, accessed 13 January 2019.
30. IOM DTM, [Libya's Migrants Report, Round 22](#). October 2018.